Lizeth Romero Zambrano v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-22-2017 
Lizeth Romero Zambrano v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Lizeth Romero Zambrano v. Attorney General United States" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 814. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/814 
This August is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-4254 
_____________ 
  
LIZETH ROMERO ZAMBRANO; D.A.E.R., 
                 Petitioners 
        
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    Respondent    
                                       
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency Nos. A208-551-639; A208-551-640) 
Immigration Judge: Roxanne C. Hladylowycz 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2017 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 22, 2017) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Lizeth Romero Zambrano and her four-year-old son D.A.E.R (collectively, 
“Petitioners”) petition for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) dated November 16, 2016, which affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) 
decision to deny their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, we will 
deny the petition in part and grant it in part.  
I 
 Zambrano and D.A.E.R. are natives and citizens of Colombia.  On September 21, 
2015, they presented themselves at the United States border seeking protection from 
persecution by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (“FARC”), a guerilla 
revolutionary group in Colombia.   
At her asylum hearing before the IJ, Zambrano testified that, prior to coming to the 
United States, she had owned an apparel store in Cali, Colombia.  On August 1, 2014, 
members of the FARC began to visit her store.  On these visits, the FARC demanded 
money and merchandise, and informed Zambrano that there would be consequences if 
she did not comply with their demands.  The FARC’s visits continued for four weeks, at 
which point Zambrano decided to relocate to Jamundi, Colombia and reopen the store, 
which she did in October 2014.   
Shortly thereafter, members of the FARC discovered Zambrano’s store in Jamundi 
and renewed their efforts to extort her.  Jamundi locals informed Zambrano that she and 
her family could be kidnapped or killed if she were to tell anyone about the FARC’s 
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visits.  In January 2015, Petitioners again relocated to evade the FARC, this time to 
Jumbo, Colombia.  In March 2015, Zambrano learned that the FARC were searching for 
her in Jumbo.   
In September 2015, Zambrano went to the Colombia Attorney General’s Office 
for advice.  It recommended to Zambrano that she go to the police and consider moving 
abroad to avoid the FARC.  Zambrano did not contact the police, but decided to leave 
Colombia with D.A.E.R. and fly to the United States, where they were apprehended at 
the border.   
In November 2015, Zambrano applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under CAT.  Zambrano indicated on her application that D.A.E.R. was to be 
included as part of her application.  On January 4, 2016, prior to the hearing on 
Zambrano’s November 2015 application, a separate application for asylum, withholding 
of removal, and protection under CAT was submitted on D.A.E.R.’s behalf.   
Petitioners presented the IJ with a variety of evidence in support of their 
applications, including Zambrano’s oral testimony and sworn statements and reports 
describing the conditions in Colombia as they pertained to the FARC (“country 
conditions report”).  Petitioners also provided a letter from Zambrano’s brother and a 
copy of the complaint Zambrano submitted to the Colombia Attorney General.   
On January 20, 2016, the IJ denied Petitioners’ claims after finding that Zambrano 
was not credible.  The IJ identified several inconsistencies between Zambrano’s various 
sworn statements.  The IJ also found that Zambrano lied about her mother’s whereabouts 
to the IJ at her hearing, as well as to her asylum officer upon entry to the United States.  
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Petitioners appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  The BIA dismissed the appeal, 
finding that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not clearly erroneous.  The 
BIA’s opinion included a footnote stating that D.A.E.R.’s claims for relief were 
dependent on, or “riding on,” Zambrano’s application.   
On December 5, 2016, Petitioners submitted to this Court their petition for review 
of the BIA’s decision denying their applications.  They argue that: (a) the IJ’s adverse 
credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence; (b) the BIA and IJ failed to 
consider independent evidence supporting the CAT claim; and (c) the BIA and IJ failed 
to consider D.A.E.R.’s separate application for relief.   
II1 
A. Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision to deny Zambrano’s claims for asylum and 
withholding of removal solely because of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.  We 
review an adverse credibility determination, like other administrative findings of fact, 
under the substantial evidence standard.  Balasubramanrim v. I.N.S., 143 F.3d 157, 161 
(3d Cir. 1998).  Under this standard, an agency’s adverse credibility determination “[is] 
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  An adverse credibility determination can be based 
on inconsistency between a petitioner’s statements in the record and “any inaccuracies or 
                                              
1 This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252.  Where, as here, the “BIA has affirmed the IJ’s decision, and adopted the analysis 
as its own, we will review both decisions.”  Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 227 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  
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falsehoods in such statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or 
falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
Here, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial 
evidence.  The IJ noted numerous falsehoods and inconsistencies between Zambrano’s 
testimony and the sworn statements in her original application, which were reiterated by 
the BIA.  First, the IJ noted that Zambrano stated in her application, through her attorney, 
that “local criminals” had initially attempted to extort them in Jamundi.  However, in her 
hearing testimony Zambrano stated that they were members of the FARC.  Second, the IJ 
found inconsistencies in Zambrano’s answers regarding her visa applications to the 
United States.  Finally, the IJ found that Zambrano admitted to lying, both to the asylum 
officer upon her entry to the United States and to the IJ at her asylum hearing, about her 
mother’s whereabouts.  Zambrano initially stated to the IJ and her asylum officer that her 
mother was residing in Colombia, but later admitted that her mother was living with 
family in Atlanta, Georgia.  These inconsistencies and falsehoods, particularly 
Zambrano’s admission that she had lied to the asylum officer and the IJ, amount to 
substantial evidence in support of the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.  
The IJ’s adverse credibility determination, supported by substantial evidence, 
provides sufficient basis to deny Zambrano’s asylum claim.  See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 
F.3d 228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating “[a]n alien’s credibility, by itself, may satisfy his 
burden, or doom his [asylum] claim”); Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“An applicant bears the burden of proving eligibility for asylum based on specific 
facts and credible testimony.” (emphasis added)).  The IJ’s adverse credibility 
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determination also disposes of Zambrano’s withholding-of-removal claim.  Lukwago v. 
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The standard for withholding of removal is 
higher than, albeit similar to, the standard for asylum. . . . If [a petitioner] is unable to 
satisfy the standard for asylum, he necessarily fails to meet the standard for withholding 
of removal . . . .”).  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review as to Zambrano’s 
claims for asylum and withholding of removal. 
B. Protection Under CAT2 
The IJ’s and the BIA’s decision to reject Zambrano’s CAT claim relied solely on 
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.  In her decision, the IJ stated that “[Zambrano] 
has set forth absolutely no credible claim that it is more likely than not that she would be 
tortured if forced to return to Colombia, and therefore her application for withholding of 
removal under the [CAT] must . . . be denied.”  App. 30.  Similarly, the BIA stated that 
“[t]o the extent that [Zambrano’s] claim for CAT relief relies on her testimony, the 
Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding necessarily precludes [her] from 
establishing eligibility for protection under the CAT through credible testimony.”  App. 
12.  
When a petitioner’s CAT claim relies solely on his or her credibility, an adverse 
credibility determination will preclude relief.   See Zheng v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 379, 383 
                                              
2A CAT claim requires a petitioner to show that “it is more likely than not that he 
or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”  8 C.F.R.  
§ 208.16(c)(2).  Torture must be inflicted “by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  8 
C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).  
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(3d Cir. 2005).  However, when a petitioner provides evidence independent of his or her 
credibility to corroborate that claim, an adverse credibility determination alone is 
insufficient to defeat a CAT claim.  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Here, Zambrano presented independent evidence to support her CAT claim.  She 
presented the IJ with a letter from her brother, which detailed the harm that Petitioners 
faced from the FARC and their reasons for fleeing Colombia.  She also presented the IJ 
with a country conditions report, which indicated the risk to civilian lives posed by both 
the FARC and the Colombian military resulting from fighting between the two groups.  
This evidence supports her CAT claim, but was not addressed by the IJ and the BIA in 
their decisions denying the claim.  We therefore will grant the petition for review with 
respect to Zambrano’s CAT claim and remand to the BIA with instructions to consider 
the independent evidence of record.  
C. D.A.E.R.’s Claims to Relief  
 Petitioners also argue to this Court that the BIA failed to consider D.A.E.R.’s 
separate application for relief.  The BIA’s opinion stated in a footnote that D.A.E.R. was 
“riding on” Zambrano’s application.  But the record is unclear on this issue.   
 Zambrano’s initial application noted that D.A.E.R. was to be included in her 
application.  On January 4, 2016, D.A.E.R. submitted a separate application for relief.  
On January 20, 2016, at the hearing before the IJ, Petitioners’ counsel seemed to indicate 
that D.A.E.R. was “riding on” Zambrano’s application.  However, neither the IJ nor 
Petitioners’ counsel addressed the status of D.A.E.R.’s separate application during the 
hearing.  Further, the IJ’s opinion does not acknowledge the separate application. 
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 Petitioners argued to the BIA that the IJ erred by failing to consider D.A.E.R.’s 
separate application.  They asserted that D.A.E.R. received specific threats of death and 
that he “feared persecution on account of a different protected ground than his 
mother’s.”3  A.R. 14.  The BIA never addressed this argument or D.A.E.R.’s separate 
application.  So we will remand D.A.E.R.’s claims to the BIA for consideration in light of 
this record.  See I.N.S. v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002).   
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review as to Zambrano’s 
claims for asylum and withholding of removal.  We will grant the petition as to 
Zambrano’s CAT claim and as to D.A.E.R.’s claims for relief, and we will remand to the 
BIA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
                                              
3 Further, the country conditions reports submitted by Petitioners indicate that the 
FARC may pose a particular threat to children, as they recruit and kidnap children to join 
their forces.   
